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PANEL 2: THE POLICY ASPECT, CONSUMER
DATA PRIVACY
Moderator
Clyde Mitchell'
Panelists
CarlHoward"
Oliver LI Ireland'"
Joel R. Reidenberg.
'....
Jay N. Soloway
MR. MITCHELL: Let's get started. My name is Clyde
Mitchell. This is the Consumer Data Privacy panel.
I think that data privacy is one of the aspects of GrammLeach-Bliley' in which, it seems to me, we all have two interests.
We are all consumers. How does it affect us as consumers, and
how does data privacy regulation affect us from a professional
standpoint? It will be interesting to see the positions of the various
panelists and how the story unfolds.
As most of you are aware, I am sure, the privacy issues in
Gramm-Leach-Bliley came into play pretty late in the process! I
am not an expert in this area and a number of things are confusing
to me.
For example, I think we heard Chairman Leach say this
Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
"Adjunct
Vice President
& Associate General Counsel, Bank Regulation, Citigroup.
".Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
.... Professor,
.

Fordham University School of Law.
Senior
.. Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Chase Manhattan

Bank.
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
2. Senator Gramm proposed to amend the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to
include the privacy provision on May 6,1999. See 145 Cong. Rec. § 4918 (1999).
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morning,3 and other legislators have commented also, that GrammLeach-Bliley contains one of the most comprehensive packages for
privacy protection. On the other side, Senator Shelby and others
have described this same package as "a sham."4 These positions
are pretty diametrically opposed. Are both accurate? Is one
correct? Is one not correct?
A number of state legislators, financial services officials and
trade association executives suggest giving Gramm-Leach-Bliley a
chance to work, proposing, "Let's see how the industry and
consumers are affected by it. Let it play out before we do anything
else."
On the other hand, at the federal level and at the state level,
what are being suggested are tougher privacy provisions.6 I think
there is legislation moving through Congress7 and in twenty-two
3. See James A. Leach, Keynote Address, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9,
12 (2001).
4. Dean Anason, Minn., N.Y. Vow to Keep ProsecutingPrivacy Cases, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 24,2000, at 1; see also Clyde Mitchell, Privacyand Gramm-LeachBliley's FinancialServices Modernization, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 19, 2000, at 3 (noting
that a Congressional Privacy Caucus was established by U.S. senators and
representatives in February 2000, to "close the loopholes created by" GrammLeach-Bliley).
5. See Memorandum from Richard D. Star to FII Members on Presentation
of FIIA's position to the NAIC Panel, Mar. 17, 2000, available at
http:lwww.fia.orgIGLBIGLB-NAICposition.htm (last visited May 15, 2001)
[hereinafter Star] ("Chairman Gramm and Chairman Leach have both
encouraged the wait-and-see approach"); see also Ian McNulty, Local Fallout
from Banking Reform Act May Be Slow in Coming, NEW ORLEANS CIrY Bus.,
Nov. 22, 1999 (quoting Carlo Michel, Vice President and Corporate Compliance
Officer for Whitney National Bank as saying "I wouldn't expect anything
immediate."). See generally Clyde Mitchell, Financial Modernization-One Year
Later, N.Y. LJ.,Jan. 19,2001, at 3.
6. See Kirk Nahra, Tick Tock- The GLB Countdown Continues,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec. 2000, at 7 [hereinafter Nahra] ("Already,
immediately following the November elections, there are reports of privacy
emerging as a 'first tier' issue in Congress next year, with predictions by
congressional insiders that 'lawmakers generally agree that medical and financial
information must be protected more securely than current law mandates."').
7. See e.g., S 324 Social Security Number Privacy Act of 2001 (a bill
proposed by Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL), intended to amend the GrammLeach-Bliley Act by prohibiting the sale of social security numbers by financial
institutions); S 450 Financial Institution Privacy Protection Act of 2000 (a bill
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state legislatures to do that.8 I guess the biggest provisions target
controversy, involve the opt-in versus opt-out concepts, and the
affiliate protection provisions.9
Robert J. Warner,"0 the New York State Assemblyman, has
said that probably no New York State legislation is going to
happen this year.1' That may or may not be true in the other
legislatures around the country. In the enforcement area, we have
had two active state Attorneys General, Michael Hatch in
Minnesota and Eliot Spitzer in New York,' who have, I believe,
worked out individual settlements with the institutions involved."
One commentator describes these settlements as being more
onerous to the institutions than the provisions of Gramm-Leach-

proposed by Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) to amend the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
intended to protect nonpublic personal information); S 536 Freedom From
Behavioral Profiling Act of 2000 (a bill proposed by Senator Richard C. Shelby
(R-AL), intended to amend Gramm-Leach-Bliley by limiting the sharing of
market and behavioral profiling, EPIC Bill Track, available at
httpJlwwm .epic.orglprivacylbiUtrack.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2001); see also
Clinton to Push Consumer Rights; Republicans and Businesses Say Privacy
Protection is Too Costly, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 2000, at A9 (describing
legislation that protects the privacy of consumers by limiting the sharing of
financial information).
8. See Anason, supranote 4 (noting that industry lobbyists may be forced to
agree to a harsher federal law, if any of the privacy laws pending in twenty.two
states are enacted).
9. See Mitchell, supranote 4 (commenting that consumer privacy advocates
contend that an opt-in provision, prohibiting disclosure without express
consumer consent, should replace the current opt-out provision and that
restrictions for affiliates should be as strong as third party restrictions).
10. Assemblyman for the 124 Assembly District. See generally
http'//assembly.state.ny.usmem/?ad=124&sh=bio.
11. See Mitchell, supranote 4.
12. See generally http:J/wwwv.ag.state.mn.usloffice/hatch.html (last visited Oct.
15,2000).
13. See generally httpJlwwwv.oag.state.ny.uslagpagelagpage.html [hereinafter
OAG homepagel (last visited Oct. 15,2000).
14. See id (stating that Hatch forced "U.S. Bancorp to discontinue sharing
customer information with third parties" and that Spitzer settled with the Chase
Manhattan Bank with an agreement limiting the sharing of information to "a
customer's name, address and telephone number"); see also sources cited infra
notes 89 and 90.
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Bliley.
Our first panelist is Oliver Ireland, Associate General Counsel
of the Federal Reserve System. 6 He has been with the Board for
fifteen years. Before that, he was at the Federal Reserve Banks of
Boston and Chicago.
MR. IRELAND: I am just going to give a very general
overview - as long as time allows.
The issue of privacy of financial information is a difficult one.
On the one hand, it is very clear that individuals place great value
on the confidentiality of their personal data, and they place
particular importance on the confidentiality of their private
financial data. For example, there are common law cases dating
back to the 1920s finding implied contract provisions, between
banks and their customers,
and requiring the banks to hold
17
customer data confidential.
At the same time, broad dissemination of data about people's
financial choices is economically efficient. Our Chairmans is
particularly fond of an example that goes something like this. If
producers of coats know that people will only buy red coats, they
won't produce any blue coats. If they don't know that and produce
15. See id. ("Citigroup Privacy Promise, the firm's current privacy policy
statement, provides several protections beyond those of [Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
including an opt-out for certain affiliate sharing.").
16. See generally http://www.federalreserve.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
17. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1426, 1430 & n.14 (1982) [hereinafter Vickery] (discussing how
the English case Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, 1 K.B. 461
(C.A.) (1924), determined that confidentiality was implied in a deposit contract
and how that case was relied upon by American courts); see also Peterson v.
Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) ("[Ilt is
implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no
information may be disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning the
customer's or depositor's account, and that, unless authorized by law or by the
customer or depositor, the bank must be held liable for breach of the implied
contract."); Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a
Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BuFFALO L. REv. 1, n.86 (1995) (naming
other American cases that have found that the implied contract between a
customer and a bank includes confidentiality).
18. Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan. See generally http://www.federalreserve.gov/bio/Greenspan.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2000).
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the blue coats, the cost of producing blue coats is waste, whereas
the cost goes up for red coats. Disseminating information about
those choices drives the cost of goods and services down and
increases standards of living.
So you have this difficult problem of balancing the personal
interest of privacy - that I think we all recognize and that
certainly is recognized in our Constitution 9 - against economic
efficiency. This, added to the traditional consumer conflicts that
are typical in the consumer financial services area, represents the
balance between the interests of individual institutions and the
interests of customers. This balancing must be sorted out by the
time we get to legislation, causing a very complex matrix of
interests that is present in almost all statutes.
This issue came up in Gramm-Leach-Bliley, I think, perhaps
just by accident. There had been a number of events in
Washington, at least in the last few years, which indicated a lack of
understanding by individual consumers about how their data was
used by the various people with whom they did business. The
biggest problems in Washington were CVS Corp. (CVS drug
stores) and Giant Food Inc. (Giant Supermarkets)
Both had
pharmacies that used a data processor to process prescription
information. The data processor also did some marketing on the
basis of the information that it processed. This story was
publicized in the Washington Post.' CVS, I think, was the holdout.
It kept its contract with that data processor for maybe a week or
19. See eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (recognizing the existence
of a constitutional right of privacy).
20. For example, the State of New York recognizes three categories of
complaints: consumer services, mortgage banking, and ATM.
See
httpJ/VvN;w.banking.state.ny.us/ccs.htm (last visited Dec. 3,2000). Others include
excessive fees, higher interest rates coupled with declining services, and the use
of tax dollars to pay for regulatory errors as areas of consumer conflict. See
Financial Consumer Associations: So Consumers Can Band Together, THE

NADER PAGE, available at http:JvAwm.nader.orgtnader-letterfcas.htmUl

(last

visited Nov. 15,2000).

21. Robert O'Harrow Jr., PrescriptionSales, Privacy Fears;CVS, GiantShare
CustomerRecords with DrugMarketing Firm, WASH. PosT., Feb. 15,1993, at Al.
22. Id; see also O'Harrow, CVS also Cuts Ties to Marketing Service; Like
Giant; Firm Cites Privacy on Prescriptions, WAsH. POST., Feb. 19, 1993

(Fmancial), at El.

74

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW

ten days.' Giant gave it up virtually immediately because the
outcry was so vociferous. '
I think recognition that there were privacy problems in the
financial area, somewhat illuminated by Minnesota Attorney
General Hatch' and his actions, raised similar concerns in
Washington.' At that time there was an interesting vehicle going
through Congress - Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Gramm-Leach-Bliley's
intent was to allow banks, which some people thought of as
isolated institutions and which have been historically separated
from other financial institutions by statutory provisions, broader
cross-industry affiliations.
This gave privacy advocates an
opportunity to argue that broader affiliation would result in a
broader dissemination of data.'
The result was legislative
provisions dealing with the privacy issue.
Privacy advocates' appeals resonated with people on both
sides of the aisle. This was not necessarily a partisan issue. We
had both Democrats and Republicans strongly in favor of privacy
requirements.' What resulted was a notice and opt-out system for
people's personal financial information at financial institutions.
Financial institutions include banks, broker-dealers, insurance
companies, and a whole host of other institutions yet to be defined
by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").' Basically, the system
23. See Robert O'Harrow, supra note 22 (discussing CVS's defense of its
contract with Elensys Inc., "a computer database specialist that also mails out
drug information on behalf of pharmacies").

24. See id. (noting that CVS gave up its contract with Elensys only after
Giant made an announcement that it was cutting with ties to Elensys).
25. See OAG homepage, supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also
sources cited infra notes 89-90.
26. See Mitchell, supra note 4.
27. See generally 145 Cong. Rec. S13883 (1999) (containing statements by
senators, including Senators Feinstein, Boxer, and Harkin, opposing the Gramm-

Leach-Bliley Act because it does not prevent the disclosure of information, such
as credit card balances, bank statements, and mortgages).
28. See e.g., Testimony April 12, 2000 Travis Plunkett Consumers Union
House Government Reform, Government Management, Information and
Technology Privacy Commission, FED. DOC. CLEARING HousE CONG.
TESTIMONY, Apr. 12,2000.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) (2000); see also 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2000)
(providing examples of financial companies).
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covers any entity that engages in business activities that financial
services holding companies traditionally have engaged in.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley says that those financial institutions have
to give their customers a notice describing their privacy practices,
specifically before they share any of their customers' data with a
third party for marketing purposes." I think disclosure to the
newspapers would be subject to the same notice requirement.
Generally, before financial institutions share customer data for
marketing purposes, they have to give consumers a way to opt-out
of that disclosure, and then honor any opt-out that follows!'
Obviously, because a lot of this is related to financial
transactions, there is a long list of exceptions to be found in the
statute. One exception allows banks to conduct processing in the
ordinary conduct of business, as it has historically been known,
without being subject to the opt-out requirement 3 What it boils
down to is that the opt-out is principally a marketing issue.
Congress went on to do something that was more or less
unprecedented. Congress required that the financial supervisory
agencies write and implement standards to safeguard personal
information for their respective jurisdictions.' Further, it urged
them to write joint rules so that the rules would be identical?7'
Normally in the consumer protection area, one agency is
30. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2000) (outlining notice requirements for disclosing
personal information to a third party).
31. Id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (outlining opt-out procedures for disclosing
personal information).
32. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L
No. 106-102, §502(e) (1-8), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 6S02(e)(1-8) (2000) (outlining general exceptions to the
disclosure of personal information).
34. These agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Company, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the insurance authorities of the States.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2000) (outlining safeguards for protection of
personal information).
36. Id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(2) (requiring that agencies work together to
ensure "coordination, consistency, and comparability" of their respective
regulations).
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designated as a rule writer - if you are going to have a rule writer
- on grounds of efficiency. In the spirit of democracy, though, they
made this a joint rule-writing effort.' Then, to top it off, they made
it an accelerated rule-writing effort. They required the agencies to
have final rules in effect six months after the effective date of the
statute?9 Those rules go into effect for financial institutions one
year after the effective date of the statute, unless later deferred by
the agencies. 9
We have been in the process of an inter-agency rule-writing
effort. We put out rules, depending on which agency you talk to,
either early or late in February, ' that are more or less identical.
There are some very minor differences between them. At this
point, we have an unknown number of comments. I have seen
probably 2,000 myself,"' including a write-in campaign from the
National Association of Private Investigatorse and a write-in
campaign from consumers based on a newspaper article in
Denver.' in addition to every major financial institution, trade
association, and major financial institution commenting.
We are in the process of trying to sort this out. We have some
speakers here today from major New York banks" who I think can
37.

Id.

38.
39.
40.
Board

Id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(3).
Id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
On February 22, 2000, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision requested comment
on the privacy rules they proposed. This report, entitled Privacy of Consumer
FinancialInformation is availableat
http:lwww.federalreserve.gov/boarddocslpressfboardacts/2000/20000222/attachm
ent.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2000).
41. See Memorandum from Governor Gramlich to the Board of Governors,
Proposed New Regulation P, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (May 8,

2000), availableat
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2000/20000510OpenMemo2.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,2000).
42. C.f. id.
43. Pamela Yip, Financial"Buffets" on the Way, THE DENVER POST, Feb. 27,
2000, at M-09 (balancing the consolidation of consumer financial needs with the
protection of consumer personal information).
44. Jay Soloway, Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel to
Chase Manhattan Bank and Carl Howard, Vice President and Associate General
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tell you in greater detail about the specifics of the rules and the
specific problems they raise and the issues surrounding those.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Ireland.
Our next speaker is Jay Soloway, who is Senior Vice President
and Associate General Counsel to Chase Manhattan Bank. Mr.
Soloway?
MR. SOLOWAY: Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Thank you to
Fordham University for inviting me to participate in this forum.
Interestingly, when I am asked to talk on this subject - and it
has been a subject on a lot of people's minds over the last several
months, if not years - one of the things I usually like to do is poll
the audience to find out what they think they mean by "privacy." I
am not going to do that now because of time, but let me give you
some of the themes that usually come up when I do this. People
usually say, "Oh, I think it's the right to be left alone." That is a
standard some of us have heard before. Some say, "It's keeping
my information secure and protected." Some talk in terms of
freedom from fraud and abuse, such as things like identity theft.
Others say, "It's the ability to contain and to have my information
not disclosed." That is just a handful of the responses I receive.
What is interesting is that everybody has a different definition
of privacy. Not only do they have a different definition, but often
they have very different perspectives, which may become evident
in the discussions of this panel.
There is a very technical perspective. Lawyers like to focus on
the technical perspective of things and analyze the words, content,
meaning and so forth. There is a very emotional perspective that
this engenders with people because it has to do with their
information and how it is used - or, in their minds, maybe
misused. There is most certainly a political aspect to it, which I
think Mr. Ireland alluded to in his comments.!'
What it comes down to, it seems to me, is that consumers have
a legitimate interest in privacy of their data. I would also argue
that financial service providers have an equally legitimate need to
gather and use information about their customers and consumers.
Sometimes it is for their benefit, for the benefit of the consumer for
counsel, Bank Regulation, Citigroup.
45. See discussion suprapp. 72-73.
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fraud prevention, or for the benefit of the institution. Sometimes,
it is to expand consumers' options and choices in services offered
to them. Sometimes it is to enhance the service quality that they
receive from institutions. All in all, what you start with is a very
broad category of privacy and data sharing, and it is hard to know
where to begin approaching the subject in any given instance.
Congress, in its wisdom, chose to use the vehicle of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act to take one of its first federal forays into this
issue.' 6 Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, there was a lot of discussion
on medical information,' 7 which is also a very sensitive area, but I
don't think it was politically ripe at that time for Congress to use
medical information as a vehicle. '
I heard only a little this morning - and I apologize for not
being here for the whole session - so I may repeat a few things.
We hear a lot of people talking about the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act. What I like to remind people is that it is also called the
Financial Services Modernization Act49, not just the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, and the intent was to modernize the financial institution
arena.' There was a great recognition by Congress that the
economy, the industry, and the marketplace were moving. I think

46. See Arber Veverka, Balancing Privacy and Commerce; Rules Detailing
How to Carry Out New FederalLaw are in the Works, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 8,
2000 at C3 ("[t]he Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's protection is the first overarching
federal privacy law ever crafted").
47. For example, Congress was discussing privacy in relation to medical
information while considering the passage of the Medical Information Privacy
and Security Act (MIPSA). See Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, The
Medical Information Privacy and Security Act (MIPSA) Selling Information Age
Parameters for Medical Privacy (Mar. 10, 1999), availableat
http://www.senate.govleahy/press/199903/9903106.html.
48. A bill entitled The Medical Financial Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 4585,
has been proposed in the House of Representatives to amend Gramm-LeachBliley by prohibiting financial institutions from sharing their customers' personal

medical

information

with

affiliates

and

third

parties.

See

http://www.namic.org/f/sc/hr4585.htm (last visited Oct. 3,2000).

49. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
50. See Press Release, Senator Phil Gramm, Gramm's Statement on
Regulation for Merchant Banking, Jun. 13,2000, availableat
http:lwww.senate.gov/-bankingprelO00O613grmlhtm.
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they will now admit it had already moved by the time the Financial
Services Modernization Act came into place.
The privacy issue did come up late in the agenda!' Most
congressmen recognize the fact that we are financial information
providers and that we are an information industry. They would
also recognize that we are becoming an information culture.
Consequently, what Congress did was support the pro aspects of
cross-marketing and the pro aspects of combining industries.'
Inherent in financial modernization is the movement of data within
the covered organizations.
We have heard that banks might combine with securities
companies and, in turn, might combine with insurance companies?
In fact, if you look back, you will see that even banks themselves
were made up of multiple institutions way before this Act came
about. My own organization, Chase Manhattan," in its more
traditional role as a banking institution, had 500-plus companies
associated in it.
There is a need to deal with consumers in a holistic way.
There is a need to use that information on behalf of the consumer
across those multiple entities. A bank used to be a single
organization. Nowadays, or even before the Financial Services
Modernization Act, it might have also consisted of a depository
institution, or several; it might have also consisted of a credit card
company; it might also have consisted of a mortgage company.'
51.

See 145 Cong. Rec. § 4918 (1999); see also supra text accompanying note

2.
52. See F. Jean Wells and William D. Jackson, CRS Report for Congress:
Major FinancialServices Legislation, The Granun-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106102): An Overview, availableat
httpJ/ww.T..senate.gov/-thomaslassetsfRL30375.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,2000).
53. See 27 More FinancialHolding Companies Born, Ar.i. BANKER, Mar. 24,
2000 at 24 ("[Tlhe Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [allows companies] to combine
banking, securities, and insurance products.").
54. Now J.P. Morgan Chase & Company after a December 31,2000 merger
with J.P. Morgan. See
httpJlwww.jpmorganchase.comlchase?pagename=ChaselHref&urlname=jpmeha
se/history (last visited Mar. 15,2001).
55. See e.g., Capital City Group Announces $.12 Per Share Dividend, PR
NEvsNIRE, Aug. 26, 1999 (noting that Capital City offers traditional deposit and
credit services, asset management, mortgage banking, credit cards, data
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Reasons for this are beyond this discussion. Suffice it to say there
were legal, geographical, and regulatory issues that necessitated
the need to have multiple companies.
Consequently, when you hear the subject that comes up from
time to time of affiliate sharing, people automatically think that it
is a bad thing. In reality, our affiliates exist for many different
historical reasons. It's the same information used by one family of
companies to benefit that same consumer, regardless if it is in one
organization or multiple organizations.'
The Financial Services Modernization Act also addressed a
subject that I am not going to touch much upon, but if you just look
in today's New York Times.' you will see it is a topic still of great
interest - identity theft. In the privacy protection section of the
Act, sub-part b enhances the criminal aspects of fraudulently
obtaining customer information from a financial institution." The
information is then used to steal a person's identity and commit
further fraud by obtaining credit, deposits, loans, or rental
properties, etc. That subject is addressed in Title V of the Act.'
What I have heard several people say, and may hear others say
in the future, is that the Financial Services Modernization Act
didn't do much for the privacy arena. 1 In fact, I think it did a lot
for the privacy arena. It took whole new provisions that financial
institutions are going to have to apply, some of which Mr. Ireland
processing, and securities brokerage services); FirstVirginia Second QuarterEPS
Increases 10%, PR NEWSWlRE, Jul. 8, 1999 (noting that First Virginia offered
banking services and that a subsidiary offered mortgage services).
56. See generally PreparedTestimony of ProfessorFred H. Cate on Behalf of
the FinancialServices Coordinating Counsel, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 12, 2000
[hereinafter Cate] ("many benefits ... have resulted from responsible
information use").
57. Timothy L. O'Brien, Officials Worried Over a Sharp Rise in Identity
Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,2000, at A4.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827 (2000) (originally noted as "Subtitle B Fraudulent Access to Financial Information").
59. See id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6821 (a) and (b).

60.

See id. at 15 U.S.C. § 6821.

61. See e.g., Testimony Commerce Trade and Consumer Protection, FED.
Doc. CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY, Apr. 3. 2001 ("The much
ballyhooed privacy provision of the Gramn-Leach-Bliley Act does not protect
consumers' privacy.").
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mentioned before,.2 to bring information, disclosures, and options
to their customers. It is not that we were not doing this in the
past Financial institutions have always cherished the information
they have about their customers. They cherished it because it was
a matter of trust, and there is nothing that a financial institution
would do to violate that trust intentionally.'
The difference is that we now have methods imposed by

regulations to deal with this problem. That is different from the
private sector coming up with their own ways of showing
individuals how they deal with information in a trusted manner.
There are a host of things that have to be done now, since the
adoption of the Financial Services Modernization Act. What do
we have to do? We are going to have to analyze the final
regulations when they come out. We are going to have to adopt
new policies and procedures - not necessarily to change what we
were doing, but just to restructure them to comply with the way the
Act says we have to disclose it. We will have to create disclosures,

paperwork, and give them out to people individually and then mail
them out annually.' This is a significant cost factor considering
62. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
63. See e.g., "FirstData Direct Banking Extends Industry - Leading Security
Certification to NetPrecision Client Web Sites, Bus. WEEIN, Apr. 15, 1999
(encouraging the use of ICSA TruSecure web certification and its Privacy Policy
Program by client financial institutions to further internet banking); VASCO
Data Securities Reports Year-end Results, 1993 Revenue and Operating Income
Increase Over PriorYear, PR NEWSWJRE, Feb. 16, 1999 ("providing information
security solutions that help organizations increase revenue and market share,
build customer loyalty, expand online services, and protect critical information
assets").
64. Banks certainly claim as much in their privacy policies. For example,
Polk County Bank states "the safekeeping of customer information is a priority
for Polk County Bank." See http:J/vwvw.polkcounty.comfprivacy.htm (last visited
Oct. 15,2000). Fleet Bank's policy says "your privacy is a priority to us." See
httpJ/Iwv,'v..fleet.com/legaLprivacypolicy.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2000). HSBC
Bank's privacy policy states "HSBC is committed to safeguarding your personal
information." See http://us.hsbc.comrinsidelpriv.acy.asp (last visited Oct. 15,
2000).
65. See Cate, supra note 56 ("implementation and compliance with these
provisions are going to be complicated and time-consuming.... sending as many
as two and a half billion notices to their various customers by December 12
[2000]").
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there are thirty-five to forty million customers around the country.
In addition, we must have practices and procedures in place to deal
with the regulations.'
We must have technology in place to
capture back the requests and preferences of individuals in a multicompany, a multi-product, or a multi-geographic arena.67
When you tell an institution that you don't want your
information shared with a third party, maybe that's applicable for
the marketing of pots and pans and magazines. Maybe it's not
applicable when you want to receive information about other
financial products or services that we ourselves don't offer directly
but we might want to partner with another type of entity to offer.
It could be a product opt-out;' it could be a geographic opt-out; it
could be an entity opt-out. Maybe you are concerned about your
mortgage information, but you are not so concerned about your
deposits, or vice-versa. It is up to you, but we have to have the
mechanism in place to track and do this. For instance, if there are
joint account holders, does one account holder have the right to
speak for both, or should we track individual joint accounts?69
These are just a few of the things that we are going to have to
deal with in this regulation, and it is going to be extremely costly to
66. See Cate, supra note 56 (requiring "implementing, complying with, and
overseeing these new regulations").
67. See Cate, supra note 56 ("The costs of establishing privacy policies,
training employees, setting up internal mechanisms to coordinate differing
information systems between subsidiaries and segregating the information of
those that opt-out will also be high. So will [the cost of] establishing new security
systems and systems for monitoring overall compliance with the Act.").
68. See e.g., Privacy Rights Become Focus for Proposals in Congress, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 25, 1999 at 1 (a staff member for Representative John L. LaFalce
suggested that "a customer could opt out by product line, perhaps allowing
disclosure of account information but rejecting sharing of loan application data").
69. For example, Washington Mutual's opt-out policy applies to all members
of a joint account. See http://www.warnuloanservice.com/xvrui/privacy.asp (last
visited Oct. 15, 2000). Huntington Bancshares Incorporated (Ohio) has an optout policy that only opts-out on behalf of the requesting member of a joint
account. See http://www.huntington.com/footer/HNB3800.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2000). Ameritrade's opt-out policy allows both options, allowing an opt-out
request to apply to all members of a joint account or just the member requesting
the opt-out.

See http://www.ameritrade.com/teUmemore/privacyquestionlO.fhtml
visited Oct. 15, 2000).
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do so. One questions whether Congress knows the best way to
deliver this to individuals or whether individual institutions as a
free marketplace should be able to develop it, and in fact
distinguish themselves between institution A or B to offer the
customers. If it's a valued right that a customer has, they should be
able to see the differences between those institutions and not
homogenize it under one scale.
I do want to point out that financial modernization and privacy
are not new to us from the regulatory and legal perspective. Mr.
Ireland alluded to court cases that have dealt with the issue."3
There is a whole long list of federal regulations that have existed
over time, with at least some element of data sharing and customer
information associated with them: the Truth in Lending Act
("TRLA");7' the Truth in Savings Act;' the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, one of the more significant provisions; the Electronic Fund

Transfer Act ("EFTA") 74 ; the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act ("TCFAP");s and, last but certainly not
least, the various state unfair and deceptive trade provisions7" with
which we all have to comply.
Some have said that, as I indicated, the financial
modernization and privacy legislation is not enough and that there
ought to be new or further enhanced provisions put in place either
at the federal level or at the state level.' I think Mr. Mitchell
touched upon one of the perspectives that my institution.' and I
70. See supratext accompanying notes 17-20.
71. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, May 29, 1963, 82
Stat. 146 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
72. Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. 102-242, Title II, Dec. 19, 1991, 105 Stat.
2334 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
73. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, May 29, 1963, as
added Pub.L. 91-503, Title VI, S 601, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat 1128 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 16S1).
74. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub.L. 95-630, Nov. 10, 1973,92 Stat. 3728
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 1693 et. seq.).
75. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Publ L.
103-297, Jan. 26,1998 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C § 6101 - § 6103).
76. See eg., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 (2001); 815 ILCS 50512 (2000); Mass.
Ann. Laws cl. 93A § 2 (2001); NY CLS Gen. Bus. § 359.e (2001).
77. See Nahra,supranote 6.
78. See Star, supra note 5.
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suspect most financial institutions, share. We have an Act that is
just taking place, we have regulations that are just being enacted as
we speak and that will be enacted sometime later this year, or
maybe even a little later if the regulators recognize the enormous
task that has to take place to put this into effect. All this suggests
that what we have is insufficient or is not dealing with the privacy
issues - which are yet undefined - in a broad enough manner.
This may be extremely premature.
The other fear is that the states, while not invited, are given
the authority to adopt legislation that is inconsistent with the
federal provision as long as that inconsistency is more onerous or
creates a higher standard." I think it would be inopportune for
states to jump in without providing the opportunity for this
legislation and regulation to, at least, play out a little bit and see
whether there are any issues that need to be assessed and taken
care of.
For an institution like my own, and many others, that tries to
do business on a national scope, it would be nearly impossible - or
extremely burdensome - to try to deal with multiple state laws
and regulations requiring disclosure.' Each state may apply a
slightly different rate or apply it for a different product in each
state. It would stifle an institution trying to offer programs on a
national basis.
In addition, let me point out, for those of you who haven't
read the Act, that the federal government also recognized the
possibility that there might be a need for additional legislation. In
fact, they call for a study in the Act." The study should be done to
determine whether or not information sharing with third parties
and affiliates needs to be the subject of additional legislation.' I
think the report is to be produced by January 1, 2002."
So there is already a recognition that "let this work, let us see
what else needs to be done, and let's give it some time." Again, it
79.

See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L.

No. 106-102, § 507 (b), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
80. See e.g., Cal. Gov't Code 7460-7493 (West 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-41
- 36a-45 (West 1996); 205 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/48.1 (2000).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 6808 (2000).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 6909(a)(1) (2000).

83.

15 U.S.C. § 6808(c).
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would be premature for others to act at this time. Let me point out
in the last couple of minutes specific provisions in the proposed
regulations that I am hoping will be further addressed as the
federal regulators look at the comment letters. First, what is the
definition of a financial institution? The banking agencies, I think,
would take a fairly broad look at what a financial institution is;
looking at the Federal Banking Act' itself to determine the
authorities or powers of a financial institution.
The Federal Trade Commission on the other hand, was a little
concerned about the breadth of that definition and suggested a
standard that had the phrase "significantly engaged in financial
activities"' as part of the definition. What troubles me about this
narrower approach, the FTC approach, is that there can be a large
institution - for example, an Internet Service Provider or an
Internet offering of some kind - that is gathering consumer
financial information and using it, without being subject to the
requirements of the Act and the regulations simply because it is
not significantly engaged in financial services. If it is a $1 billion
business and only five percent of its operations are financial, then
maybe it would not be considered a financial institution.
I would argue, instead, that any institution that gathers
consumer financial information, particularly non-public personal
financial information, as the Act and the regulations would define
that, should protect that information the same way. A consumer
and a customer should have the right and expectation to have that
information treated the same way, regardless of whether it was
acquired by the more traditional financial institution, or, as we go
into the new century, by the non-traditional financial service
provider.
Second, a core element that I think still needs to be addressed
is what is non-public personal financial information? -' This is a
84.
85.

12 U.S.C §24 (2000).
16 CFR § 313.3(k)(1)(Federal Trade Commission definitions).

86. Section 509(4) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services
Modernization Act defines it as "personally identifiable financial information"
given by a customer to a financial institution. The Securities and Exchange
Commission altered the definition to exclude information obtained by a brokerdealer, fund, or registered advisor, reasonably believed to be lawfully available to
the general public from (1)
the financial institution, if the customer states that the
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subject that Mr. Ireland and I have discussed from time to time.
The regulations as they come out have several pages devoted to
this subject. ' Yet I am hard pressed to find a reason why they find
any information that a financial institution has about a consumer is
non-public personal financial information.
It is the "any information" that troubles me, because I think it
disregards the whole concept of what is confidential information
and what is financial information, or what is public versus nonpublic. There is some language in there trying to distinguish public
and non-public, but I do not think it goes quite far enough.
I would ask people generally, whether they think their name,
address, and phone number is non-public financial information. I
would think it is not, since in the majority of cases you can find that
information in any phonebook or on many Internet sites or by
many other easily accessible means. One, I do not think it is nonpublic information; I think it is public. And two, I do not think it is
financial information. In fact, there was a colloquy in the
enactment of the statute that concluded that financial information
had to do with the financial content of the information that you
had.' Gramm-Leach-Bliley is really geared towards items such as
your balances, your credits outstanding, and so forth. It is not
simply, whether you have an account with a bank, a securities
company, or an insurance company?
I am not sure people would think that is non-public, nor do I
think it is financial. Most of us issue checks every day and most of
us have our names and addresses on those checks. Very many of
us also use credit cards to charge, and that simply says you are a
credit card customer of that institution. In fact, there are a whole
lot of people these days who will sign up for one of a thousand
Internet services and give out a wealth of information about
themselves, not knowing anything about to whom they are giving
such information. Perhaps, the definition that apparently is

information is available from a public source, (2) information that the
government is legally required to record and make public, and (3) information
widely distributed by the media, such as telephone or newspaper. See
httpl/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42484.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
87. See 12 CFR § 40.10(2000) (Privacy of Consumer Financial Information).
88. Cf. source cited supranote 34.
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espoused in the regulation is trying to restrict more than what was
intended by protecting the true non-public personal financial
information.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you. I wonder if I could ask you a
question. I do not want you to divulge any of Chase's strategy, but
I believe that you entered into some sort of an agreement with
New York State in January,"' and I think U.S. Bancorp entered into
a similar agreement with Minnesota." They are the two that I am
aware of, although there may be others. Do you see these types of
arrangements as increasing?
Do you see other financial
institutions doing the same to avoid hassle, and really going further
than Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires one to go?
MR. SOLOWAY: I will give you two comments on that. One
is that yes, we did enter into an understanding with the New York
State Attorney General. I think a lot has been said about that as
going beyond the requirements of the Financial Services
Modernization Act. The truth of the matter is that we had already
instituted the majority of the things that we announced as part of
our agreement with the Attorney General by the time the
Attorney General had even started to investigate the issue." I am
not going to comment on whether they were investigating it
because they thought it was a real problem in the industry or with
Chase, or whether they felt it was a political opportunity to seize
upon an issue that was very public at the time.
Heading towards the second part of your question, for
financial institutions that have a strong dedication and
89. Chase Manhattan and the New York State Attorney General's Office
agreed that the bank would no longer share private financial information about
its customers with unaffiliated third parties, including telemarketers. See
Kathleen Day, Chase Settles Privacy Complaint; Bank, New York Reach
Agreement, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2000 at E4; see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
90. U.S. Bancorp and the Minnesota Attorney General settled a suit
regarding privacy on June 30, 1999. U.S. Bancorp agreed to end its sale of
customer information for non-financial marketing purposes. See Press Release,
U.S. Bancorp, Minnesota Attorney General and U.S. Bancorp Settle Customer
Privacy Suit (Jun. 30, 1999), available at http:J/lww.flrstar.comlaboutlii-nevwsfr.htmil (last visited Jun. 12, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. Baneorp Press Release]; see
also OAG homepage, supranote 14 and accompanying text.
91.

Id.
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commitment to privacy and have an image to uphold in a
community, it does not serve them well to do battle with
government representatives on issues like this in the public forum.
Even if you believe you are right and you have done nothing
wrong, there is a great deal of pressure that comes to bear when it
appears - even if it is not true, but it appears, I emphasize - that
you are trying to oppose privacy standards for your customers and
your customers are not following practices that others think are
warranted. So the pressure that comes to bear in some cases may
be due to actions that you have taken; but, in certain cases, it is
simply due to a matter of perception in the marketplace.
There is a task forcen that exists now of at least twenty
Attorneys General that have been working on this issue and that
have already contacted many financial institutions around the
country. I think that many of them are putting that same pressure
on other financial institutions, that I think will be placed in the
same position and confronted with the same decisions that Chase
was, whether the wish to stand up their beliefs, that what they have
done is right and so forth, or maybe take a simpler course of action,
agreeing to do things that in fact they had already been doing.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Soloway.
Our next speaker is Carl Howard. He is General Counsel for
Bank Regulation at Citigroup.
MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon.
I am going to talk briefly about the constitutional implications
of privacy restrictions. I'll talk about opt-ins versus opt-outs as a
privacy remedy. Finally, I am going to talk a little bit about privacy
polls.
When a legislature enacts privacy restrictions, it may not think
92.
U.S.

See Orla O'Sullivan, Making Internet Banking Safer for the Customer,
available at http://www.us-banker.com/usb/articlesusbjan-2.html

BANKER,

(last visited Aug. 11, 2000); see also Comments of Attorney General to Joint
Agencies' Proposed Rules (OCC, OTS, FRB, FDIC), 651 Fed. Reg. 8769 (Feb.
22, 2000), available at http:lwww.naag.orglfeatures/privacycoumnentsl.cfm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2000) ("It is essential that the final regulations expressly prohibit

financial institutions from entering into marketing agreements that permit any
non-affiliated third party to charge a customer's credit card or debit a customer's
account without first requiring the consumer to explicitly agree to the
purchase.").
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about it this way, but it is usually enacting a restriction on speech,
as that term is understood in the First Amendment context. We
have a line of Supreme Court cases, starting with Virginia Boardof
93 in 1976, which holds that the First Amendment protects
Pharmacy
commercial speech.' In fact, you will probably remember that a lot
of these cases involved attorney advertising."'
The constitutional protection for commercial speech is a
qualified protection. It is not the relatively absolute protection
that exists for political speech:' You have the situation when that
somewhat protected constitutional right comes into conflict with
another constitutional right - the right to privacy - there can be
an interesting conflict.
A recent case that rules on this conflict in a relevant context to
the kind of discussion we are having today is the decision of the
Tenth Circuit in a case called US West. 7 US West involved an FCC
regulation that required telephone companies to secure customer
consent before they use customer-calling data to solicit telephone
services from their existing customers. 3 The Tenth Circuit found
that the FCC regulation was an unconstitutional restriction on US
West's right of commercial speech?'
We have a consensus that the controlling case here, and the
case that the US West court relied on, is a 1980 Supreme Court

93. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
94. Id. at 780-81 (distinguishing between commercial speech and ideological

expression and holding that commercial speech was protected because it was
"information of potential interest and value").
95. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding in part that
"advertising by attorneys could not be subjected to blanket suppression"); see
also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that attorney's
aggressively solicitation of accident victims was not protected by the constitution
"because the state had a legitimate interest in preventing aspects of solicitation
involving undue influence and other forms of vexatious conduct").
96.

See generally, Jonathan W. Emord, Contrived Distinctions:The Doctrine

of Commercial Speech in the First Amendment, POL'Y ANALYSIS, No. 161,
availableat http'lwwvw.cato.org/pubs.pasfpa-161.htm (last visited De. 11, 2000).
97. U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
98.

Id. at 1228.

99. See id
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decision called Central Hudson.'o CentralHudson gives a four-part
test to decide what to do with a restriction on commercial speech.
The Court said in Central Hudson that (1) first, speech must be
lawful and not misleading; it can definitely be blocked by the
legislature if it runs afoul of that."0 ' But, if we assume that it is both
lawful and not misleading, the Supreme Court said that (2) you
ought to ask whether the legislature has a substantial interest in
regulation of the speech in question;"0 (3) whether the regulation
directly and materially advances that interest;" and (4) finally,
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to fit the desired
objective."° If we assume lawful and non-misleading speech, as I
suggested before, privacy will usually qualify as a substantial state
interest - or federal interest, for that matter.
But the third and fourth parts of the test"° from Central
Hudson are highly judgmental. The US West court, the Tenth
Circuit, thought that the FCC's privacy concerns were arguably
legitimate, but it reversed in US West because it found that the optin that the FCC required US West to use was overkill." Instead,
the US West court said that an opt-out would have worked just as
well, without having the constitutional infirmity vis-A-vis free
speech."
If you look beyond the US West case, you will find that there
are Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases that address this
conflict between privacy rights and commercial speech rights, and
that they are essentially all over the place." You can find a
100. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
101. Id. at 563, 566.
102. Id. at 564, 566.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 565, 566.
105. See id. at 564-566.
106. See U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1240 (10th Cir. 1999).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994) (finding the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compensation
Act of 1992 neutral in terms of content); City of Cincinnati v. Discover Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (finding that a city revoking permits to
distribute free magazines on public property violated the First Amendment);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (holding a
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holding that stands for just about any proposition you want in this
area." But I think the one thing that you can say with some
certainty is that when a legislature thinks about this kind of issue,
the broader and more pervasive the restriction they enact, the
more likely it is to have a constitutional problem that wil result in
a negative balance of the kind the US West court found. So the
lesson I would get out of this is that legislators ought to be thinking
about doing a balancing exercise and not thinking of privacy as
simply an absolute right that trumps all other rights.
Now let's talk about the kinds of choices that legislators have
when they fashion privacy remedies. There is a continuum of
available privacy remedies. If you start over on one side,
hypothetically - sorry, Mr. Soloway - you have done nothing.
Moving up from there, you have something that you might label
New York City Parks Department Use Guidelines specifying that the City would
furnish and operate sound equipment used in Central Park concerts
constitutional under the First Amendment because the guideline met
governmental interests without regulating content); Members of the City Council
of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 7S9, 104 S. Ct. 211S
(1984) (deciding that a local ordinance prohibiting the placement of signs on
public property did not violate the Fi-st Amendment because the ordinance was
not content specific and served a "sufficiently substantial" esthetic governmental
interest in maintaining the quality of life of its citizens and maintaining property
values); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Assoc., 453
U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981) (holding that a statute prohibiting a non-profit
group from placing unstamped mail into the mailboxes of private homes was
constitutional because mailboxes are not within the public domain); Bailey v.
Morales, 190 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a state law prohibiting the
solicitation of chiropractic patients based on a pre-existing condition was
unconstitutional because the statute did more than protect proper state interests);
Falanga v. State Bar of Georgia, 150 F3d. 1333 (11th Cir. 1993) (deciding that a
Georgia law prohibiting lawyers from soliciting clients face-to-face was
constitutional under the First Amendment); Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397 (7th
Cir. 1998) (finding that an Ilinois statute that aimed to prevent real estate agents
from persuading owners to put their homes on the market because of fear that
the racial composition of the area was changing violated the First Amendment
because the state failed to justify how the statute advanced state interests); Van
Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (Sth Cir. 1995) (finding that a statute
regulating automatic dialing-announcing devices was constitutional and did not
violate the First Amendment because the government was protecting the privacy
of its citizens without considering the contents of the speech).
109. Id.
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"full disclosure," telling your customers what you do. Coming up
further, you have an opt-out remedy. Further still, you have an
opt-in remedy; and then, finally, you have absolute prohibition.
Every step up the continuum involves an increase in the cost
and regulatory burden and a reduction of free market functioning
as a way to allocate resources. Every step up the continuum is a
decision that the government ought to be intervening and reducing
free market functioning as a way to allocate resources and to make
decisions. Now, as to the first step on the continuum, doing
nothing may not sound like much of a privacy remedy, but it makes
a lot of sense in a free market economy, if the problems that you
are thinking about appear more hypothetical than real. In a free
market, the presumption should always be against regulation
because regulation always distorts free markets and always has
costs associated with it."' Therefore, the party that asserts the need
for regulation should have the burden of demonstrating that need
fairly convincingly.
In Title 5 of the Financial Services Modernization Act,
Congress rejected a do-nothing option, as we have been discussing,
and opted instead, for affiliate sharing - sharing of information
within a financial services conglomerate."' Congress decided that a
full-disclosure option was the way to go. So it went one step up on
the continuum of privacy remedies.
Disclosure is, of course, a remedy that is widely used in our
country to ensure that consumers have adequate knowledge on
which to base their decisions. Potential consumers who do not like
the affiliate-sharing arrangements that are laid out in the privacy
notice that financial institutions are now required to give can
decide that they do not want to do business with that company. In
a market with many financial services providers, some of whom
will be competing on the basis of the privacy protections they are
affording to their customers, these are meaningful choices. There
110. See, e.g., Peter Vandoren, Strangulationby Regulation: How It Happened;
What To Do, NAT'L. REV. Vol. LII, No. 8 (stating that forty years of scholarly
research shows that markets have been regulated unnecessarily and that
"[riegulation usually benefits a privileged group, makes everyone worse off than
they would have been regulation, or does both").
111. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fimancial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 508, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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are tons of banks, securities brokers, and insurance underwriters
out there to choose from. They will have different privacy policies
and they wAil be telling people what those policies are and letting
them choose their financial services providers on the basis of those
policies.
As to third-party information sharing, as we have heard,
Congress went a step further on our continuum of remedies and it
mandated a user-friendly opt-out procedure. "2 A formal opt-out
provision gives a consumer an important right of choice that goes
beyond the sort of market opt-out that exists when a consumer
chooses one service provider over another, because it lets the
consumer say, "I want to do business with you and I don't want
you to share the information with third parties."
Think about the question, "Okay, if that is good, what is wrong
with an opt-in as opposed to an opt-out?" You might say to
yourself that an opt-out versus an opt-in is simply two different
ways to set the default option. Alternatively, you can think of
them as burden-shifting devices; they decide who has the burden of
going forward. It is important to recognize that an opt-out
provision gives essentially the same consumer protections as an
opt-in, but without the significant procedural burdens and
compliance costs that are associated with opt-ins. "
Opt-ins are essentially impossible to use with existing
customers because, no matter how many times you mail a form to
your customer and no matter how many times you call them on the
phone to talk to them about this, they generally will not respond.
This does not necessarily mean that they are responding
negatively; they are simply not responding. Even for new
customers, an opt-in makes a default choice for the customer that
is hard to rationalize, given where we are today.
Opt-ins are difficult to rationalize for affiliate sharing because
they function as an anti-affiliation and an anti-cross-marketing
112. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 502(b).
113. See Michael A. Benoit, Nicole F. Munro, Recent Federal Privacy
Initiatives Affecting The ElectronicDelivery Of FinancialServices, 56 Bus. LA1w
1143, 1155 (May 2001); see also Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your
Name: A Pragmatic Look At The Costs Of Privacy And The Benefits Of
Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2,111 (2000).
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provision. In other words, an opt-in creates a presumption that
cross-marketing is not a good thing. We have just decided in the
Financial Services Modernization Act that our national policy is to
favor financial services affiliation and to favor cross-marketing, and
a default provision that is based on the opposite assumption does
not make a lot of sense.
But I would suggest that even using such a default for third
parties does not make a lot of sense in an economy that is very
much an information economy. The information economy that we
are in today is characterized by the free flow of information, and
other industries participate fully in this free flow of information.
Other industries not only do not have opt-in provisions, but they
don't have opt-out provisions. They don't even have disclosure;
they just share information. We are not doing anything to restrict
that sharing of information. You may think we should restrict, but
that is a much broader question than what we ought to be doing
with the financial services industry. If providers of financial
services are subjected to significant constraints on free flows of
information when others are not, they and their customers will
become second-class citizens of the new information economy.
Finally, if you think that opt-ins are the way to go because
everybody knows that consumers are very concerned about
privacy, then we would like to take you on a visit to the Citigroup
privacy poll archive. In our poll archive we have a poll for
whatever proposition you would like to advance about privacy that
proves you are right and that no other view can be correct.
For example, we have a poll that says ninety percent of U.S.
citizens are very concerned about privacy. We also have a poll that
says seventy percent think that information gathering and sharing
by commercial companies is a bad thing. We have another poll
with a similar cross-section of U.S. adults. It starts by telling the
respondents that commercial companies like to share information
so that they can better understand what products each customer
wants. This saves their customers from providing the same data
repeatedly and allows the companies to offer discounts to
customers who take multiple products, and so they can prevent
fraud. And guess what? When you tell that to U.S. adults, seventy
percent of them say, "Well, if that's why you want to do it, then I
think information sharing among commercial companies would be
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a good thing." We have a poll that says ninety percent of Internet
users think that consumer information gathering at web sites is a
good thing if it is fully disclosed and explained.
Finally, we have the poll that we think is actually the most
meaningful poll. It is based on asking a lot of people a whole lot of
questions about privacy. What it shows is that about tventy-four
percent of the people in the United States are what you might call
"privacy absolutists." They generally do not want to share any
information with anybody about anything. Similarly, sixteen
percent of U.S. adults are "privacy unconcerned"; they don't care
who knows what about them and they are going on Oprah this
afternoon to tell all. But the large majority, sixty percent, are
"privacy pragmatists": they say, "It depends. I may be a little bit
concerned as to what the grocery store is doing with all that
information they get when I swipe my Frequent Shopper's card,
but hey, if they are going to give me discounts in return for
my data, I guess I don't care."
A complete prohibition on information sharing among
financial services companies, or an opt-in which is the close cousin
of a complete prohibition, makes sense if you think that seventyfive percent of the people in the United States are privacy
absolutists. If, on the other hand, you think what this poll suggests,
that absolutists are only twenty-five percent and about seventy-five
percent are either privacy pragmatists or privacy unconcerned,
then a blend of disclosure and opt-out is what makes sense. The
good news is that is just what Congress did in Title 5 of the
Financial Services Modernization Act.
Thank you for your attention.
MR. MITCHELL: Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Howard.
I wonder if I could ask you something. I guess my own
reaction when somebody sends me something, a form letter from a
financial institution, you're right, I probably do not respond. I
know that one of the big worries with the opt-in provision is that
you are not going to hear back from anybody.
Do you have any other kind of client contact things you can
base that on, where notices go out and you are supposed to get a
return? Like proxies, do they ever get any proxies back?
MR. HOWARD: I think the US West litigation is useful on
this point. US West first tried mailings to its customers to get them
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to address this issue. They found that they could get only a five or
ten percent response rate of any kind.11' That is to say, ninety or
ninety-five percent of their customers did not respond at all.
They then tried a telemarketing campaign, which, in theory,
should have bumped the results up dramatically. It did get a higher
response. About twenty-eight percent of the people said that they
would opt-in; about thirty-three percent, or thereabouts, said that
they would decline to opt-in; and forty percent of their customers
said, "I don't want to talk about this," they declined to make a
choice."'
So, is losing seventy-two percent of your customers better than
losing ninety percent of your customers? Sure, if you think there is
any merit to the kind of privacy poll data that I just talked about.
A default choice makes sense. It is not a simple issue by any
means.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
Our last panelist, last but not least, Joel Reidenberg, is a
Professor at Fordham. Joel?
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you.
It was a pleasure to be able to suggest that I get to go last,
since that means I get to be disagreeable with everything that was
said before me.
MR. MITCHELL: They have the right of rebuttal. Everybody
gets another round.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Absolutely.
I wore my favorite conference tie for the purpose. For those
of you who cannot see it, it's the Tin Tin character, which is a very
famous French cartoon character that goes out battling the
enemies and the bad guys. I think that is a good lead-in to what I
have to say about the Financial Services Modernization Act."6
I would argue that the statute is in fact a weasel's response to
privacy. If I were to give it a report card, I would give it a C-minus.
114.

See U.S. West v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1239, n.12 (10th Cir. 1999) ("U.S.

West also solicited approval [for use of private information] from customers by
mail. Only six to eleven percent of residential customers and only five to nine
percent of business customers responded to the direct mail trial type and bill.").
115. See id. at 1239.
116. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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As many of you know, I am a reasonably strict grader here at
Fordham. A C-minus is pretty much the minimum passing grade
you can get. If you get too many C-minuses, you flunk out of
school. I really think that is what we see in the Financial Services
Modernization Act. It certainly does some things that are
valuable. I would probably agree with some of the observations
that our co-panelists have made, and I will certainly disagree with
others, and I am going to focus mostly on some of the things the
statute does and what it does not do.
In looking at privacy, I think it is a mistake to view data
privacy in the financial services context as merely associated with
confidentiality in whether a bank or financial institution keeps data
private from others, because that is only part of the problem, part
of the issue.
There is a set of widely recognized data privacy principles that
have been elaborated, first by the U.S. Government, codified by
the OECD,"'7 subscribed to by the U.S. Government"' and every
major bank here in New York. That set of principles sets out a
whole series of standards for the treatment of personal
information."9 It is really about allovng the citizen to participate
in decisions about the collection and use of their personal
information. That is really what this is all about.
I am going to use the term "citizen" vAllfully; I am not going to
use the term "consumer," because privacy is a citizenship issue."3
117. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD
is the successor organization to the Organization for European Economic

Cooperation, which was formed as part of the Marshall Plan, to oversee
American and Canadian aid to Europe after World War II.
See
http/I-www.oecd.orglaboutoriginslindex.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2000). Today,
the OECD consists of thirty country members, who each make financial

contributions to sustain the organization. See
http://vw.oed.orglabout/genra!rmde%.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2000)
(providing a forum to "discuss, develop, and perfect economic and social policy).

118. The United States became a member of the OECD in 1961. See
http'//viwwT.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htm (last visited Dec. 11,
2000).
119. See generally http/Jlwv.voecd.orglldstilstiitlsecurlprod/PRIV-EN.HTM
(last visited Sept. 21, 2000).

120.

Joel R. Reidenberg, Cyberspace And Privacy. A Nev Legal Paradigm?

Resolving Conflicting InternationalData Privacy Rules In Cyberspace,52 STAN.
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It is not just a business question. It is one that affects all of us. It is
a political question. It has implications for political decisions.
When we look at the basic privacy standards, we see some very
key elements:
Purpose limitations"' - if I am collecting information about
individuals, it should be for defined purposes. If I use it for other
purposes, I need consent. I need some form of permission.
Whether it is opt-out or opt-in we can talk about, but the notion is
there must be a purpose for which I am collecting the information.
If I am not going to use it for that purpose, I've got to go back to
the individual in some fashion.
Relevancy - is the data relevant to the transaction at hand?
There is a presumption that it is not proper to go and engage in
information grubbing, just asking for information because it is
there, to amass profiles and warehouses of data about individuals.
Transparency" - it ought to be transparent to the citizen who

is collecting their personal information and how is it being used.
Accuracy - data should be accurate. Individuals ought to have
an ability to access personal information about them and ask for
correction of errors.
These principles must have some sort of enforcement
remedies. Individuals ought to have a means to enforce their
privacy rights. There ought to be sanctions if privacy principles are
violated.
What do we see in the Financial Services Modernization Act?
Not much. It focuses on disclosure.Y That's one element. That is

L. REV. 1315, 1341 (May 2000) (defining privacy as an attribute of citizenship).
121. See generally Testimony April 3, 2001 Mr. Ed Mierzwinski, Consumer
Program Director U.S. Public Interest Research Group, The House Committee
On Energy and Commerce, FED. Doc. CLEARING HousE CONG. TESTIMONY,
Apr. 3, 2001 [hereinafter Mierzwinski].
122. See generally Dan L. Burk, Muddy Roles for Cyberspace,21 CARDoZO L.
REv. 121 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Burk] (arguing that transparency is essential
for protecting consumers engaging in on-line commerce).
123. See, e.g., Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: GrammLeach-Bliley and the Constitutionalityof FederalFinancialPrivacy Legislation, 55
U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 164 (2001) ("Congress [adopted] Title V of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act... to govern financial institutions' disclosure of [private
financial] information.").
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good. It's good that you have improved transparency. But it
doesn't touch at all on purpose limitations."" It doesn't touch at all
on relevancy.
The enforcement remedies are "sort of." It establishes a very
convoluted jurisdiction between different regulatory agencies and

carves up enforcement to those regulatory agencies, but it creates
no private cause of action. So the citizen whose privacy rights
might be violated has no direct action under the statute. There are
some indirect means we can talk about - whether it is a deceptive
practice if this is disclosed - but the point is, as a privacy statute,
this does not provide for enforcement remedies for the citizen

directly.'
It does make disclosure an important point. It focuses on
transparency,zs at least providing one basic standard of privacy. Its
scope of coverage seems to be broad where it refers to financial
institutions, and then has what we've heard might end up being
quite a broad definition of financial institutions. We'll have to see
how that plays out. As a quick digression, I forget whether it was
Mr. Soloway or Mr. Howard, - I think it was Mr. Soloway - who
raised the point that there may be something anomalous if we

regulate financial institutions but we don't touch other actors out
there

in

the information

economy

trafficking

in

similar

information. That is absolutely right. That is a major problem that

124. See Mierzinskd, supra note 121 (Mr. Miermwinski referred in his
testimony to the notion that "information privacy law.., promotes
transparency." He also stated that "the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act falls short of
meeting Fair Information Practices in several areas... first, it fails to require any
form of consent (either opt-in or opt-out) for most forms of information sharing
for secondary purposes, including experience and transaction information shared
between and among either affiliates or affiliated third parties... second, while
consumers generally have access to and dispute rights over their account
statements, they have no knowledge of, let alone rights to review or dispute, the
development of detailed profiles on them by financial institutions.").
125. However, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 did not create explicit private rights of action either, but the courts have
allowed such actions nonetheless. See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and
Reform in Private SecuritiesLitigation:Dealingwith the Meritoriousas Well as the
Frivolous,40 WN1 AND MARY L. REv. 1055,1067.
126. See Burk, supra note 122.
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we have in the United States. 1n This statute does not touch that; it
doesn't really address that issue.
Let's look at some of the things that the statute allows, such as
sharing personal information with third parties, provided that there
is an opt-out. 12 The opt-out works on the basis of some disclosure
- and we'll find out, depending on how the final regulations come
out, how meaningful the disclosure really will be. But it's kind of
interesting because one of the things that the Act does is prohibit
sharing account identification numbers with third parties." I think
this grew out of the U.S. Bancorp situation in Minnesota." But it
does not say anything about sharing account balances with third
parties, and it is not clear that the disclosure would make that so
obvious to consumers. I think that is something that would
certainly be a major concern for individuals doing business with
their bank; if, for example, they were to discover that the bank is
sharing their account balances with different third-party entities to
offer them goods like grass seed for their house, or something like
that.
The statute also allows for the sharing of information with
affiliates. The statute essentially sanctions it and says it is perfectly
legal.'31 A citizen has no right to stop it and there is no legal right
to stop that under the statute. The only restriction is that the bank
has to tell you yearly that they are going to violate your privacy."'
They have to give you annual notice once a year that they are
going to be sharing with affiliates.
Well, what does that mean? Let's think about it. If it is a
127. See suprap. 85.
12& See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
129. Cecilia Kempler and Robert Woody, Living With The Gramm-LeachBliley Act Privacy, 1185 PLI/CoRP. 205, 218.
130. See supra OAG Homepage, note 14 and accompanying text; supra U.S.
Bancorp Press Release, note 90 and accompanying text.
131. See Charles M. Horn, FinancialServices Privacy At The Start Of The 21st
Century: A Conceptual Perspective, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 89, 99 ("[In the
waning days of the fall of 1999, a series of last-minute compromises were reached
among Senate and House leaders to modify the legislation's privacy provisions to

... permit financial firms to share customer information with affiliates...").
132. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, GrammLeach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §503.
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bank, it might be the brokerage house; it might be an insurance
company. Part of the importance of this statute for the financial
services sector is we are expecting to see an increase in the nature
and type of affiliations among financial institutions. This means
that the range of entities with which information can be shared
without the citizen having any right to say no is going to be
expanding significantly.
Now, just think of all the different financial accounts you have.
How aware are you of the identities of each of the different
affiliates that your financial institution has? Chances are you
probably have no clue, and the chances are if you asked the
company, you'd have a hard time getting a clear answer.
The statute says that sharing of personal information with
companies performing services for the financial institution is
permitted without an opt-out. '3 So if it's a company that is
performing services for the financial institution or helping the
financial institution offer a product, an opt-out is unavailable. If it
is a joint marketing effort with another financial institution, as
defined by what the Act and regulations will tell us, there is no
need for an opt-out. They just need the initial notice."
There is a track record for unsolicited marketing of credit and
insurance in the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act." Such
marketing is permitted under the Act, provided there is an opt-out.
Companies will now go and say, "I'll sell you a mattress on thirty
days' credit," purporting that to be an extension of credit,
therefore qualifying under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to gain
access to your credit report." We can easily see that happening in
this context.
If it is the Burpee Seed Company and they are going to offer
grass seed to you on thirty days' credit, is it now a financial
product? If it is a financial product, the bank or any other financial
institution can share the attendant consumer information. You
133. See Gramm-Leach-Blley Financial Services Modernization Act § 502.
134. Id.
135. See generally Sandra B. Petersen, Note, Your Life as an Open Bool: Has
Technology Rendered PersonalPrivacy Virtually Obsoktc?, 4S FED. CoiM,. U.
163 (1995) (discussing some of the shortcomings of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
in the area of credit marketing and credit insurance).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(e)(3) (2000).
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have no right to stop it. So if you look at the way the regulations
are structured, you can see a very strong incentive cropping up for
some interesting structuring arrangements between sellers and
financial institutions.
The statute makes a distinction between public and non-public
information." We heard a little bit about that. This is particularly
troubling from a data privacy point of view because the issue is
what is being done with personal information, not where you get
that personal information. It's how is a company treating personal
information and what rights does a citizen have in participating in
those decisions.
I think it is a real misnomer to categorize this battle as one of
privacy against business. It seems to me that there is nothing
harmful in saying that citizens ought to be entitled to participate in
the decisions about them, particularly when the companies argue
that the only reason for doing these cross-marketing and profiling
activities is to benefit consumers. If the goal is to benefit
consumers, then let them participate in those decisions.
A couple of quick reactions, and I want to leave some time for
discussion. Some of the cost arguments that we hear against the
Financial Services Modernization Act are that the compliance costs
will be extremely onerous."' Any time a new regulation goes into
effect, there are certainly going to be some compliance costs. If the
compliance cost of having regular disclosure and setting up opt-out
systems for third-party sharing is going to be so onerous for banks,
I think that is very demonstrative evidence that banks have not
been adequately dealing with privacy concerns. In addition, there
is very strong evidence that there is a great need for strong privacy
legislation in the financial services community.
With regard to some of the issues of opt-out versus opt-in,
financially savvy Americans tend to believe that their financial
information is very sensitive data, indeed. I think we have to take
some of the polling data with a grain of salt, as Mr. Howard
suggested, because you can find polls that will support almost any
position."9 I think the only consistent theme that that the polls
137.
138.
139.

See infra pp. 85-87.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
See supra p. 94.

2001]

SYMPOSIUM

evince, namely that the populace is so divided, is great proof that
citizens want to be involved. They want to know what is going on
with their personal information. But where the issue is financial
services data, which the people view as particularly sensitive
information, then it does not seem right to put the burden of
justifying why one's data should not be sold and bartered, on the
citizen.' It seems perfectly reasonable, on the other hand, that the
burden should indeed be on the actor who wants to profit from
such information, to demonstrate why he or she ought to be
entitled to use it.
Let me address, for a moment, one point that hasn't come up.
Then I want to talk about what I'll call the sustainability of some of
the privacy legislation in the Financial Services Modernization Act.
The first is that part of the attractiveness, I think, for Congress
in this statute is to increase the competitiveness of American
banks. These are banks that are operating on a global basis. If you
look outside the United States, these banks are obligated to
comply with far stricter privacy laws than the Financial Services
Modernization Act" sets up. So, in effect, what we have set up in
the United States is indeed a set of second-class citizens, where
Americans will get second-class privacy by the same institutions
that are giving first-class privacy to their customers outside the
United States.
Now, in terms of sustainability, I think Mr. Howard is
absolutely right that there are important constitutional questions
that vill arise in the context of how the laws and regulations are set
up. I part company with that view, however, as to whether it
becomes as significant an obstacle to privacy legislation as we have
heard about.
The data privacy sphere is very different from the commercial
advertising cases that we have seen out of the Supreme Court.
There hasn't yet been a Supreme Court commercial advertising
case that focuses on data privacy and fair information practices

140.

But see Esther Dyson, Control of Private Data Belongs in Hands of

Consumers,Not Vendors, Los ANGELEs TmEs, Mar. 20,2000 at C3.
141.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 106-102,

113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
142. See cases cited supranote 10.
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concerns. The commercial advertising cases are all focusing on the
solicitations themselves, on the commercial solicitation, and/or the
content of the message.I'3
I think we have to take the US West case with a bit of a grain
of salt. As a circuit decision, it focused on a number of issues that
were different from the pure opt-in/opt-out question: whether the
powers were properly delegated to the administrative agency by
Congress;" whether Congress had given clear enough marching
orders. 5 If anyone reads the case and reads the docket, I think it is
almost impossible not to conclude that the Tenth Circuit grossly
misrepresented the factual docket in the case. In deciding that the
opt-in rule was unsatisfactory,1' the Tenth Circuit basically said the
regulatory agency didn't consider any alternatives.' The point in
fact is that the agency had very extensive findings on opt-in versus
opt-out that were certainly not addressed by the Tenth Circuit in
its opinion.
But coming back to this, I guess you are left with two
questions. First, is this commercial speech at all? There is some
jurisprudence coming out of the Supreme Court today that
suggests there is room to argue that data sales will not be
categorized as First Amendment speech. I would point to some
language in the United Reporting v. Los Angeles Police
Department" case and the Condon v. Reno'" case, even though
those were in different contexts. In each of those cases the courts
were talking about personal information and the sale of personal
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
See U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10h Cir. 1999).
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231.
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1238-1239.
See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1238, 1239 ("[T]he FCC's failure to adequately

consider an obvious and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out
strategy, indicates that it did not narrowly tailor the CPNI regulations regarding
customer approval.").

148. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting, 528 U.S. 32 (1999)
(holding that California could decide not to give out arrest information, entirely,
without violating the First Amendment).
149. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, which limited public access to information about any
individual that was obtained through State's motor vehicle records, was
unconstitutional, as a violation of the Tenth Amendment).
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information, and they were talking about it as commercial or
informational productsY. If they talk about it as a thing in
commerce, then that brings it outside of First Amendment
jurisprudence." So there may be some room to argue that data
sales do not constitute commercial speech at all.
If it does not, we go back to the CentralHudson test." There
will certainly be, I think, great room for Congress to very clearly
articulate why privacy legislation, be it opt-in/opt-out, is justifiable
as the narrowest response to the privacy problems identified by
Congress. I think that it would certainly be possible for Congress
in almost any instance to justify opt-in, just as it would be to justify
opt-out.
I think I will conclude on that provocative thought.
MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Reidenberg, thank you for such a
boring presentation.
[Laughter.]
Let's give our panelists a chance to come back with any
questions or comments. Mr. Ireland, you were the first to speak.
MR. IRELAND: As I sit here, I think the debate is not about
privacy. The debate that we are engaged in is related to privacy
because that is the instant subject matter. The real issue in
controversy here is how do you best solve problems of this nature.
Do you best solve them through private market choices, including
choices made by individual consumers; or do you best solve it
through government solutions?
I have been in the government solution business at least for
the last fifteen years, and every year I am more in favor of private
market choices. I look at the European privacy principles and I
look at this statute, and frankly, as an individual, I wouldn't rely on
either one of them to protect my privacy. I have always assumed
that any transactions I made with a check or a credit card would
150. See i. at 463; see also Los Angeles Police Dep't., 523 U.S. 32 (1999).
151. See Los Angeles PoliceDepL, 52S U.S. 32; see also Condon, 155 F.3d 453.
152. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 567-71 (1980) (holding that a statewide ban of commercial
advertisement by electric companies, where the advertisement in question was
not false or illegal, was unnecessary and over-inclusive to carry out the state's
goal of conserving energy and therefore violated the First Amendment, even if
the company in question operated a monopoly).
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become known to the person I least wanted them to be disclosed to
and have conducted myself accordingly.
But really, the tension is do we establish a set of sort of "one
size fits all" rights, which is what you do when you do it by
legislation, or do you let the market sort itself out? This issue
came up at a time of increasing sales and dissemination of
information in the marketplace. There is a certain lack of
consumer information about what my economist colleagues call
"market transparency. '" What we didn't have was a period of
time for that kind of transparency to develop and for consumers
and financial institutions to establish their own solutions to these
problems.
If you listen to Mr. Howard's polls,' there may be a financial
institution that fits each of those consumer's desires, his profile,
and the people to whom he wants to be marketed. Maybe the best
way to do that is for the consumer to choose with whom to do
business. If the consumer does not know what the financial
institution is going to do with his or her data, he can ask. If he or
she is given misleading information and something different is
done with the information, he or she can look to traditional
common law remedies for fraud, as well as state unfair and
deceptive practices statutes," which may apply.
So I think you can talk about privacy, but the real tension is
faith in governmental solutions.
MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Soloway?
MR. SOLOWAY: I would just comment on one point that Mr.
Reidenberg made that struck me. I think it is somewhat unfair to
conclude in any way that financial institutions have not been
recognizing and taking care of the privacy concerns and the privacy
and data-sharing issues of its consumers, customers, or citizens
simply because it has yet to spend anywhere from $10 to $30
153. Market transparency defined as a "process by which information about
existing [market] conditions, decisions, and actions is made accessible, visible,
and understandable." Barents Group, Trends in Information Disclosure and
Market Transparency,INSIGHTS, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (1999), availableat
http://www.barents.comInsights/issue4/Disclosure.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2000).
154. See supra pp. 94-95.
155. Cf.Vickery, supra note 17.
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million per institution to comply with the new set of rules and
standards that were arbitrarily imposed by the government.
The fact that we haven't met those particular methods,
approaches, or criteria does not mean that individuals have not
been receiving the privacy protection that is appropriate for them.
In particular, when we looked at our own institution and went back
and checked our complaint records and so forth, we found
nonexistent or minuscule complaints relating to privacy, data
sharing, and anything else. In most cases, even when we
categorized them as such, they turned out to be more of an inquiry
than a complaint.
Now, having said that, I recognize that I will anticipate a lot
more complaints forthcoming now that the issue has been brought
to the forefront, and the rhetoric surrounding it has, I believe,
scared people into concerns that may not be warranted - in
particular, a concern that is being posed by the government in its
own standards.
MR. HOWARD: I would like to try to respond to three
questions that have been raised.
We heard the question, why should we put the burden on the
customer when what might make more sense is to ask the person
who wants to use the data to justify the use they want to make of
itY
I think the simple answer is found in something that I
suggested in my opening remarks,'" and that is that government
ought to use the least intrusive remedy that it can to get the desired
results. You can always hypothesize an extremely thorough
remedy that will absolutely get the desired results, but it will also
have very high costs. We have at hand remedies that are relatively
lower cost, like disclosure and opt-out, whereas opt-in is a remedy
that is pretty expensive in the grand scheme of things.
We might hypothesize for the economy as a whole that it
would be good to let the government make all decisions for us in
the economy because the government will always have consumers'
interests in mind. We have chosen in our country not to go down
that road because we think that the free market is better at
allocating resources than the government is, and, when we do have
156.
157.

See supra p. 103.
See supra pp. 89.
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government regulation, we try to make it the least intrusive
government regulation that will achieve the result that we desire.
This goes back to this continuum of remedies thought.
We also heard the question, "Will we become second-class
citizens as compared to the Europeans, since they are in some
respects using an opt-in regime?"'" If you think of privacy as an
absolute right and think that it trumps all other rights or that no
other rights are relevant, you can certainly conclude that you
should have maximum privacy protections.
If you want to look at it in a somewhat broader context, you
might ask yourself, "Well, what do U.S. economists think about
Europe generally?" I think that U.S. economists generally think
that Europe is over-regulated and under-competitive.'59 If you go
to England, just to pick the European country that is the closest to
the United States, I think you could probably get a consensus that
people in England have a lower standard of living compared to
people in the United States. That is, I would suggest, not an
accident. It is the result of being over-regulated and undercompetitive.
Some ask whether it is a nice thing to make employee lay-offs
difficult. If you consider only the short-term interests of those
employees, the answer is yes. It's a very friendly thing to do to
make it hard to lay off employees. If you ask, "What has it meant
for the European economy to make it difficult to lay off employees
as compared to the U.S. economy," I think the answer is fairly
obvious. The U.S. economy is far more vibrant than the European
economy for just that reason."
Finally, on the US Wes?61 case, we have the question: is data
See supra p. 103.
See generally Roger Blanpain, Toward a New European Corporatism?,20
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 497 [hereinafter Blanpain] (noting the European
Central Bank's efforts to crack overregulated national markets on the continent).
160. See e.g., MGMT REV., Oct. 1, 1999, at 42 (discussing the role of the United
States in the global economy and stating "[ojnly fourteen percent of the U.S.
workforce is unionized today, down from twenty percent in 1983. Other
industrialized nations tend to have higher rates of unionization. This provides a
high degree of labor market flexibility in the United States, an important spur to
productivity and competitiveness.").
161. U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
15&
159.
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sales First Amendment speech?"tz I think that's an interesting
question. On the other hand, what is at issue in US West is a
narrower question. The issue in US West is whether that company
can talk to its own customers." 3 I think that is certainly commercial
speech. That is what the FCC tried to essentially prohibit in US
West with an opt-in remedy. I would suggest - as I have before -

that this is very close to a prohibition.
If you think about the logical result you get if you go down the
privacy absolutist road, - if you really believe in the privacy
absolutist viewpoint, - you will find yourself wanting to cut off the
companies' ability to talk to their own customers. That is certainly
commercial speech and is protected by the First Amendment. I
would like to hear a counter-argument to that.
MR. MITCHELL: Joel, we've got to keep it quick. We have
to throw it open for some questions. But you have a right to rebut.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Actually, I was going to
answer a couple of other points that came up. I think it is
unfortunate1 to demonize privacy legislation.
To call it
"arbitrary" is surprising, especially since Chase was one of the
first banks to endorse the OECD Guidelines that would require
transparency.
Mr. Ireland, hit it on the head. Is it a question of regulation
and rights, or is it a question of letting the market do what the
regulations hope to achieve?"r Industry, the financial industry, as
well as many others, has been very effective in stonewalling any
privacy legislation, by saying, "Let us give it time to let the
marketplace sort it out." '
I'll give you an exercise to do when you get home today. Get
the five different pieces of junk mail in your mailbox. Call the
company and try to find out where they got your name and what
their privacy policy is. I will bet that on the first phone call you will
be unsuccessful. You will have a real hard time finding that out.
One of the banks in this room - I won't name the bank -

162.
163.
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166.
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Id.
See supra pp. 82-83.
See supra p. 73.
See suprapp. 70,83-84.
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sent me a solicitation last year for a financial product and
highlighted in the letter was the following statements: "We protect
your privacy. We make a commitment to your privacy." I called
the bank's 800 number and asked how I could get the privacy
policy. "What privacy policy?" was the answer. I said, "Well, it
says so in the letter." They asked, "Are you a customer?" I said,
"No. I'm interested in deciding whether I want to be a customer.
How can I get your policy?" The answer was, "we can't give it to
you unless you're a customer."
The marketplace does not work here. It simply hasn't worked
and it is not going to work. What we see is that there is a
tremendous financial incentive to use the personal information, get
as much of it as possible and profile it as much as possible.
However, there is no financial incentive thus far, to completely
inform the citizens about what is happening. I don't think it's a
question of privacy absolutists or not. I think all of the privacy
laws are looking to balance what is the appropriate participation of
citizens in the use of their personal information.
Looking at Europe, sure, Europe is over-regulated and has a
lot of economic problems.67 It is not because of privacy legislation.
There are things in the European Privacy Directive"~ I would never
want to see in the United States. However, there are things in that
Directive that we are foolish not to adopt.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
Any questions from the audience after hearing some of our
initial skirmishes here?
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
QUESTION: Where is the role of transition in a regulatory
environment for the financial industry? I illustrate that both with
the affiliates and the third parties.
On the affiliates side, the worst abuse that I have seen is the
bank giving information to its brokerage affiliate. 69 This is the
167. See Blanpain, supra note 159 and accompanying text.
168. Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, Art. 32, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (requiring Member
States to adopt legislation conforming to terms of Directive).
169. See Risky Business in the Op. Sub.: How the OCC Dropped the Ball:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigationsof the House
Committee on Commerce, 106"' Cong. 37 (1999) (testimony of industry insiders
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situation where the elderly person Ath a maturing CD is corralled
by the securities person and convinced to invest in something that
is entirely inappropriate.Y That is because the elderly person is
accustomed to the bank's FDIC terms and sees that as being the
same thing. That is going on today.
On the third-party side, when I fill out a loan application with
a bank, I am truthful because I could go to jail if I am not."' On
the other hand, I can go to a web site where they will give me
information in exchange for my information, and I lie like a rug
because there is no reason I shouldn't. And, why should they have
information from me?
In terms of the market working out what information is worth
what, obviously a bank's information is much more valuable than
some web site's because of the inherent accuracy of the bank's
information. In most instances, that will all get worked out over
time. But it will still be decades before most people are
accustomed to deposit insurance; then they will be relying upon
their banks for a different sort of privacy. Likewise, it vill be a
long time before the total deregulation of financial services leads
us to treat our depository institutions the same way we do other
companies.
MR. MITCHELL: Would you like any particular panelist to
respond to that, or is that just an observation? You answered your
own question.
QUESTIONER: I am saying it will work out. But it appears
that there is no concern on the part of our legislators, or the
regulators in writing the regulations to the law, to take into account
that this is a deregulating situation. It's not tomorrow, but it still is
today.
MR. HOWARD: First of all, I find your example fascinating.
indicating several examples of nefarious business practices related to elderly
bank customers).
170. See ag., Susan Tompor, DETRorr FREE PRESS, December 27, 2000
[hereinafter Tompori (discussing examples of elderly individuals who have lost
money in "callable CDs." The elderly investors generally buy the CDs from
brokers thinking that they have purchased a short-term, no risk investment only
to find out that they have "locked up their money for 15 or 20 years."1).
171. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j and SEC rule 10b-5 thereunder).
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My colleagues at the SEC would be apoplectic, because you have
described somebody who is bamboozled by the broker and sold
some inappropriate investment,"n which is a violation of their sales
practice rules. They have a regime that they at least are very proud
of, which they think provides a remedy for that problem. So, to the
extent that you have a problem in that area, it is not that the
information was disclosed. It is that they were sold a bad
investment.
What if they were sold a good investment? What if they left
the bank and the bank said, "We pay you; you've got a money
market with us, and we have to pay deposit insurance against that.
We have to comply with all those banking regulations, and we hold
reserves against your checking account and so on. We can offer
you a money market fund that is not a deposit but is invested in a
government securities mutual fund that is not insured and is going
to pay you two percentage points more." Do you want that?
Maybe they just got a whole lot better deal by virtue of crossmarketing. You don't know. It's case-specific.
One way to go about this, - the argument that was made in
the congressional process - is since banks are expanding
affiliations and are going to be dealing with more people, we
should start now. The other argument is, "We don't know what is
going to happen. Why don't we do what we set out to do, allow
greater affiliations, and then wait and see if that creates a
problem?" Again, it boils down to where your faith is. Is your faith
in the market system, or is your faith in the government deciding
what the rules are? My own view, somewhat like Mr. Howard's, is
that the 20th century was not terribly kind to planned economies.
MR. MITCHELL: I want to thank our panelists for coming.
Fordham University Law School thanks you. We all enjoyed it.
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